

# Integrative Results Based Management in Governments: The Matrix Approach

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## Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to propose tentative solutions to the achievement of development results through the implementation of results-oriented management practices in government.

The matrix approach developed herein is based on a concept that combines elements of the strategy (mobilizing targets, programmatic targets) and implementing structures (units, resources, etc.) – that may, in principle, be applied both at the macro and multi-organizational level (within the general scope of supranational, national, local state governments, etc.) and intra-organizational level (internally in government organizations, private companies and community entities, as well as their units). The matrix approach is, in this sense, a governance instrument.

## Introduction

Good management is the management that achieves results – in the public sector meaning, at the end of the day, creating public value. Results do not happen by chance. Governments in general, public organizations, policies, programs, projects etc. are not self-oriented towards results. Moreover, it is not enough to design them well, since results are not self-achievable. The main issue is not that leaders, organizations and governments are not concerned about achieving results, but rather that they are unaware of what must be done to achieve them. Formulating a strategic plan will not ensure its implementation. Implementation is a category increasingly thought to be out of control, basically due to postponement, bargaining and persuasion strategies and maneuvers that characterize the "implementation game" (Bardach, 1977; Pressman & Wildawski, 1973). Corporate (and government) strategies fail mainly due to implementation rather than design issues.

Many authors and practitioners attribute different weights to several drivers of results, such as strategy awareness (shared formulation and communication of the strategy), leadership (capacity to influence and mobilize people), structure (clear definition of competencies, areas and levels of responsibility), processes (detailed definition of procedures), projects (converting results into actions that crosscut structures and processes and that are under intensive monitoring), contractualization (agreeing expected results and the means to achieve them, verification mechanisms and incentives), people (staffing, training, commitment, alignment of values), information and communication technologies (technological innovation and integration,

automation), funds (availability, scheduling and regularity). However, if these drivers are implemented in a restricted and disintegrated fashion, they will not ensure the achievement of results. That is, all these dimensions must be harmonized within a good results-oriented management model.

This is not simply the obsession of the new public administration agenda (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008). It is an increasingly important theme not only because demands have become more complex and resources relatively scarcer, but also because innovative management technologies allow unprecedented means to face the challenge of generating results – a key aspect of the transition from a public policy management model based on opinions to one based on facts that distinguishes solid democracies today (Segone, 2008).

There are many consolidated performance management methodologies already tested in various contexts and organizations and acclaimed in managerial literature<sup>1</sup>. There are broader models, that adopt the perspective of governments or organizations as a whole (strategy and organization), and models focused on certain dimensions of organizational performance, such as finances, marketing, operations and logistics. In addition to the wide range of approaches, there are also approach silos, which requires the construction of broad models capable of integrating various perspectives. Fundamentally, one observes a wide variety of concepts and typologies, allowing different theoretical and methodological orientations to be drawn (Marr, 2009; Poister, 2003; Neely, 2007 Boyne et al 2006). However, some conclusions emerge from the analysis of these concepts and experiences regarding the attributes of a good model for assessing results.

First, a results-oriented management model must be dynamic, in the sense that it cannot be limited to defining and measuring performance (Halachmi et al, 1996; Neely, 2007). Managing performance means defining it (planning), achieving it (implementation), monitoring and evaluating it (control and ensuing adjustments). In short, it is not only about incorporating PDCA cycle perspectives, but a concept of generating performance information and incorporating it into decision-making (both internal and external), generating demand for such information (institutionalization), without any ideologization or purely ritualistic behaviors.

Complementarily, a results-oriented management model must be comprehensive (Boyne et al, 2006; Neely, 2007) and based on a broad concept of performance that includes both the effort and the expected results (assuming that there are no results without alignment of efforts, and that unaligned efforts only promote performance by chance). Managing performance not only means managing results, but managing the alignment of the efforts to achieve the results in question.

Thirdly, but no less important, a performance management model has to be multidimensional (Boyne et al, 2006 Neely, 2007), that is, to take into account multiple dimensions of effort to align them with the results: processes, resources, structures, information systems and, particularly, people. One should avoid reductionist and unidimensional definitions in which significant aspects/dimensions of the effort and the result are left aside, while others that have little importance remain in the model.

In short, even regarding performance management methodologies acclaimed in managerial literature, the construction and implementation of dynamic, encompassing and multidimensional management models for results is still a challenge. Thus, the proposal is to build results-oriented governance models organized in networks of integrated organizations that operate results management systems in a consolidated manner, through the shared use of the performance information generated (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008).

## **Matrix Approach and the Pursuit of the Lost Links of Results-Oriented Management**

The matrix approach concept seeks to build a new Government architecture (the set of organizations and the model of resource allocation), oriented to results, by matching program results (outputs and outcomes) to their execution links throughout the implementation structures. This new concept is based on the limitations of the functional structure, which tends to fragment the creation of value by thematic area, thus making it more difficult to deal with cross-cutting issues<sup>ii</sup> and to focus on systemic results, which tends to produce frequent jurisdictional conflict.

However, it is also based on limitations of the purely programmatic structure that, by itself, cannot ensure coherence between the results of programs and the results of development plans, neither convergence between the actions required to implement programs and the organizations' own strategic agendas (which, in turn, drain budgetary, financial, human and information resources in their execution).

Nonetheless, programs are not self-executable, neither are organizations self-oriented to results. The work of a "program manager" without formal authority to make decisions (defining priorities and exercising hierarchical coordination) and allocate resources over one or more institutional domains tends to promote loss of control over implementation mechanisms. Programs get lost in some space in between strategy and processes.

Therefore, a new architecture is needed, a kind of platform underlying the existing structure, in such a way as to integrate multiple dimensions that are potentially fragmented: development strategies, programs, organizations and resources.

Matrix approach is, in this sense, a concept of network government, by definition: "multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be addressed, or easily addressed, through a single organization" (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001). In a relational sense, networks are "a set of relatively stable relationships which are of a non-hierarchical and inter-dependent nature linking a variety of players, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests, acknowledging that cooperation is the best way to achieve common goals" (Börzel, 1998).

Trust, coordination, negotiation, connectivity, construction of relations and balance between control and freedom are the challenging principles for network arrangements to work (Saravia, 2002). Although it retains hierarchy (the subordination of institutions and entities within the Government structure) and dependence (of resources, mainly budgetary ones), the matrix approach is oriented to integration between Government areas and other extra-government ones for the achievement of common results.


Taken as a form of organizational structure (definition of how tasks are to be divided, grouped and coordinated), networks represent an alternative to vertical and hierarchical functional structures, ideal for conditions demanding flexibility, innovation and change. In this sense, the network is an organization structure capable of gathering individuals and institutions around common goals. Its features include flexibility and structural dynamism; democracy and decentralization in decision-making; and a high level of autonomy of its members. Information sharing is the basis for building networks. Networks do not replace pyramidal organizations, nor are they feasible alternatives to all kinds of organizations and goals, but they are very responsive to hybrid situations, where merely functional structures do not meet the increasing complexity of the internal and external environment (Morgan, 1997).

In this regard, the concept is result-oriented, pragmatic, selective and contractual. It is result-oriented because it seeks to align<sup>iii</sup> the government architecture (organizations and allotted resources) with the results of the Government's priority programs. In a pragmatic way, it seeks to link, optimize and engage the parts of Government architecture (organizations and their

resources) that contribute towards reaching the expected results of priority programs, while not neglecting the basic, comprehensive and macro-structural dimension of management transformation processes. The selectivity attribute underlies the focus on a limited portfolio of priority programs that add high value to development goals, without ignoring the existence of non-priority programs and other results that Government organizations are required to deliver. It is also contractual insofar as it induces organizations' compliance and commitment (whether in isolation or in networks) with results viewed from the perspective of agencification (programmatic) and contractual management (Jann & Reichard, 2003). Nonetheless, it does not promote loss of specific sectoral or organizational identities.

The implementation of the matrix approach follows three basic steps (Chart 1) – which will be addressed in detail in the forthcoming sections: a) Endow the strategic agenda with coherence, establishing the link (1) between the results of programs and development results; b) Align the government architecture with the government's strategic agenda, establishing the link (2) between programs and implementing organizations, thus promoting effective resource allocation (links 3, 4 and 5) between budget, individuals and information and the strategic agenda; and c) implement the government's result unit, thus promoting matrix control of results.

**Chart 1. Basic Structure of the matrix approach and its links**




**The Construction of Link (1) Between Results of Programs and Development Results**

The construction of Link 1 seeks to integrate programs and development targets. It is a link aimed at ensuring coherence, convergence and consistency in formulation. Sometimes this relationship is unclear: the extent to which the execution of programs leads, in a convergent and coherent way, to the achievement of development macro-targets (mobilizing targets that, by definition, should act as elements of convergence towards the intermediary results of programs, projects and structured actions).

The construction of link 1 is necessary so that the execution of programs can ensure the achievement of the vision underlying the mobilizing targets. In this sense, it is necessary to clarify the cause and effect relation (in other words, the added value chain) between program

results (outputs and outcomes) and the set (by definition, not too lengthy) of mobilizing targets that express the development vision. Chart 2 illustrates the construction of Link 1.



Therefore, it would be necessary to build a relational model, a bridge that allows for two mutually complementary movements: a) design programs or adjust their results according to a simulation of impacts or their balanced contribution to the generation of mobilizing targets; b) design or adjust mobilizing targets according to the capacity of programs to generate results.

Usually, the relations between mobilizing targets and program results are defined according to a qualitative relational model based on the “logical framework” methodology, which states that macro goals unfold into micro goals, and successively into actions. Although it is a qualitative methodology subject to several problems of interpretation of the wording of goals (not always stated in an objective way), the major limitation of the logical framework is its unidirectional hierarchy: the macro to micro direction cannot be reversed (aggregation of micro-programming levels does not ensure coherent macro-results) and the macro to micro programming levels follow a tree shape (thus preventing the impact of a set of results from crossing over to another set at a higher level).

It is best to build a quantitative relational model, based on a structured set of measurable dependent and independent variables. Variables are indicators of results (outputs and outcomes) of programs and mobilizing targets, whose relation may be statistically deduced through: a) multi-varied treatment (multiple correlation and factor analysis), with simulations of impacts of programs on mobilizing targets based on the association of variables; or b) analysis of causality models, more specifically through structural equations, with simulations of impacts of programs on mobilizing targets based on the causal relation of variables.

Alternative “b” is always better, although it basically depends on the quality, scope and timeliness of data fed into the model, which is probably the most complex issue of its application in the public sphere. In any case, this task entails several methodological limitations: limitations of indicators (in measuring results of programs or mobilizing targets), different temporalities, intervenient factors and rival causes, etc. Such limitations reduce the potential of prediction/simulation of the model and increase the error margin but, on the other hand, they still

**Expectations  
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represent an expressive gain in making it more objective if compared to qualitative models based on subjective claims.

If it is utterly impossible to build a quantitative relational model, there are feasible qualitative alternatives, among which the construction of “mini projects” or “partial bridges” based on the assumption of strong relations between variables (where such relations may be diagrammed as a relational map, with emphasis on the strong relationships) and periodic assessments (that allow verifying the strong relations based on past events).

The result of link 1 should be the definition of a portfolio of priority programs, whose results are calibrated to reach mobilizing development targets in a convergent way. This result, obtained by means of a quantitative relational model, usually requires two rounds of relational calculations, and may demand successive approximations: a) up the value chain, based on the definitions of which should be the program results to generate pre-established development targets; and b) down the value chain, based on the definition of which are the development results that may be attained, based on a range of results of pre-established programs (presumably at the threshold of operational and resource restrictions).


### **Construction of Link (2) Between Programs and Implementing Organizations**

The construction of link 2 takes place through the integration of programs and organizations that provide, in this perspective, its implementing platform. Construction of link 2 requires efforts to align programs, the government architecture and the set of allocated resources to priority results. The dimension of link 2 becomes clear with the construction of a framework of priority programs-organizations that, as illustrated in Chart 3, shows the interrelation links between programs and implementing arrangements.

It is clear that neither the program nor the organization should be considered a management unit by itself; but rather the set/network of implementing nodes – which may be a unitary set with relatively low complexity (program with a single implementation link or organizations that implement just one program, circled in green) or a set of multiple elements of high relative complexity (programs with multiple implementation links of organizations that implement multiple programs, circled in red).

The framework of priority programs-organizations does not exhaust the universe of action of organizations nor the whole range of government programs. First, it is not limited to government organizations, and may include inter-government relationships (with organizations from different federative entities), with international organizations and with private partners (non-government organizations, public-private partnerships etc.). Secondly, organizations have parallel agendas bound to other programs (that are not priority) and stakeholders that legitimately claim attention.

**Chart 3. The construction of link 2 (vertical and horizontal alignments)**



The set of networks or nodes within the scope of the matrix approach should be addressed from both the vertical and horizontal perspectives, thus closing a matrix circuit (Chart 3) through two basically complementary means of alignment to generate results: a) vertical alignment, to align the implementation links (of different organizations) within the scope of each program, defining specific coordination arrangements; b) horizontal alignment: to align organizations (their strategic agendas and operational arrangements) with the results of the programs that cut across them.

**Chief**

**Executive**

### **Vertical Alignment**

Vertical alignment implies aligning the various organizations that implement a given program. It means establishing, for each program, the network of organizations involved in its implementation. In this sense, there may be networks of simple nodes or intra-sectoral programs implemented by a single organization. However, there may also— and more frequently – be networks of complex nodes or multi-sectoral programs implemented by two or more organizations.

Promoting vertical alignment for each program implies defining coordination arrangements (which may be self-coordination, alternation, collegiate, internal or external supervision etc.), defining its implementation plan and the contribution to be provided by each part, besides selecting program managers or coordinators of the network of implementing nodes. The coordination arrangements should correspond to different degrees and levels of interdependency (bilateral, multilateral, etc.) between the implementing nodes that make up a governance network within the scope of the same program. In this sense, there are two core issues. The first one is to create, within the scope of the program’s implementation network, a shared systemic vision. “Interdependence as a factor that brings about coordination is mediated by its perception [...] unless two units recognize themselves as mutually dependent they will

hardly accept spontaneously the need for coordination. This perception deficit is frequent in organizations and units whose introspection and insulation blind them to the link with others in a work environment” (Ariznabarreta, 2001, p. 03). The second issue is the need not to standardize the coordination arrangements of program implementation networks since, just as organizational structures, they are subject to contingency-related criteria – more complex levels of external and/or internal interdependency demand more or less complex coordination arrangements. (Ariznabarreta, 2001; Brinkerhoff, 1996)

In turn, the selection of a program manager should be based on the alignment of personal managerial profiles and of those required by the particular arrangement. It is preferable for the intra-sectoral program manager to be the head of the organization. Concerning multi-sectoral programs, their manager or coordinator of the network of organizations should depend on the coordination arrangement adopted.


Vertical alignment takes place by means of vertical agreement, forms of agreement on results between Government (“contractor”) and the implementation network of each program (“contracted party”, represented by the set of implementing organizations), represented by the Program manager, as coordinator of the network of implementing nodes. The results, object of the agreement, should be the program goals (presumably aligned with the mobilizing targets) and the Government should ensure the required means to achieve them, with differentiated treatment in resource allocation (no restriction, precedence in the allocation of labor force and information resources, managerial flexibilities, mainly concerning procurement and contracts, etc.), expanding the concept of results-oriented budgeting. Monitoring and evaluation of the agreement should be under the responsibility of the Results Unit (the topic of the fifth section of this paper) and clear merit-based incentives (public recognition or censure of program managers and teams involved) and financial incentives (bonus and variable remuneration for program managers and teams involved) to strengthen the achievement of the agreed targets by the people in charge of the program’s implementation. Chart 4 illustrates vertical alignment.

On the other hand, vertical alignment not only provides an implementation platform, but also a platform for matrix formulation of the program’s results.


### **Horizontal Alignment**

Attaining horizontal alignment means integrating and adjusting organizations to the programs to which they are related, assessing and promoting appropriateness and readiness. Viewed from the horizontal perspective, there will be sets of simple nodes made up of uniprogrammatic organizations (involved in the implementation of a single program) and sets of complex nodes, formed by multi-programmatic organizations (involved in the implementation of two or more programs, whether intra- or multi-sectoral). Horizontal alignment is basically a task of pursuing conciliation and convergence of agendas, trying to introduce in the organization’s agenda its contribution to generate results of priority program. Chart 5 illustrates this pursuit of convergence between programs targets (P targets) and organizational targets (O targets).

**Chart 4. Vertical alignment**



**Chart 5. Horizontal Alignment**



Alignment of agendas should result, to some extent, at a micro-organizational level, in the alignment of the organizations’ management model, so as to match strategies (the new agenda, tied to the program results that cut across the organization), structures, processes, staff profile and information systems.

Therefore, to promote horizontal alignment in each organization, three essential actions are required: strategic planning, institutional diagnosis and organizational change. Strategic planning should be used as a means to align organizational strategies with the results of related programs, harmonizing them with other demands identified, or introducing in the organizations' strategic agenda the results of programs to which they are related. There should be no methodological dogmatism within the scope of what is here called "strategic planning", but the use of current methodologies should provide, at least, definitions concerning the organizational identity (analysis of external environment, key-players and mission statements), to incorporated commitment with program results. Institutional Diagnosis aims at assessing the effective readiness to implement the new aligned strategy. The diagnosis should be comprehensive and try to assess whether the remaining elements of the management model are compatible and support the execution of the reformulated strategy. Organizational change might require a review of structures, processes, individuals, information systems etc. towards improving and aligning the whole management set to the new strategies.

The diagnosis may evidence different organizational implementation capacities, organizations that are ready to contribute to the generation of results of the programs to which they are related, in relative harmony with other demands; organizations requiring minor adjustments to become capable of effectively contributing, implying the need for agreed institutional development targets and for some external support towards them; and organizations incapable of any contribution, requiring intervention or intensive transformation efforts. The set of diagnoses can be a valuable input to formulate comprehensive public management policies, since it may shape instruments, focus and specific incentives to modernization at the micro-organizational level.

Similarly to vertical alignment, the agreement of results between the Government (as "contractor", by means of the results unit) and Organizations (as "contracted parties", by means of their top managers) is also intended to promote horizontal alignment. The agreed results should at least be reflected in the targets of programs related to the organization and other priority results linked to other demands identified. Here also the Government is in charge of ensuring the required means to fulfill the agreement. Monitoring and evaluation are under the Results Unit, through merit-based incentives (public recognition or censorship of top managers and teams involved) and financial incentives (bonus and variable remuneration to organization directors and teams involved).

### **Other Alignment Processes**

Links 3, 4 and 5 link organizations and programs to budgetary and financial resources, individuals and information systems, respectively. These are secondary links to link 2, in the sense that they must be bound to the programs/organizations nodes, but overlooking them would hinder the attainment of results, because the appropriate means would be absent.

Concerning link 3, the matrix approach suggests aligning the processes of budgeting, financial execution and control to the requirements set forth in the Government's strategic agenda. It means that resources should be allocated and made available according to strategies set forth in the strategic agenda, and the control system should inform any incompliance, for appropriate correction. It seems obvious, but most implementation problems result from disintegration between planning, budget and finances. Such disintegration is explained by the lack of strategic perspective (link 1) or by the excessive rigidity of budgetary and financial procedures to adjust to changes in context.

Link 4 deals with the dimension of individuals and implies incorporating strategic human resources management, knowledge management and leadership development. Firstly, strategic human resources management should focus on promoting the alignment of skills to meet vertical (programs) and horizontal (organizations) commitments. Furthermore, it should adopt performance assessments and pay for performance schemes based on skills and results (bound to vertical and horizontal results agreements). Knowledge management should focus on the creation of knowledge networks (internal and external) and dialogue spheres that allow exchange of experiences and mutual reinforcement between policies and programs. Strengthening the leadership system should improve the capacity to provide strategic direction, integrating actions and promoting motivation based on commitment (of minds) in the place of traditional systems focused on command and control.

Link 5 connects programs and organizations to information technologies, essential to provide not only optimization of work processes, but to ensure monitoring and evaluation of results, transparency of actions and the relationship foundation over which the various nodes will be integrated.

As counterpart to links 3, 4 and 5, it is necessary to try to align Government support areas (budget, finance, control, human resources, procurement, logistical resources, information technology, etc.) typically structured as highly regulated and standardized central systems, with the matrix rationale, in the sense that the support areas should confer differentiated treatment to priority nodes.

### **Results Unit and Matrix Control**


The Government results unit is a locus for setting, monitoring and evaluating results, integrated with the vertical and horizontal perspectives, where intensive management of programs takes place in integration with intensive management of organizations. The results unit should provide matrix control, comprehensive, integrated and systemic verification of achievement of priority results and the resources allocated to achieving them and, based on this, the appropriate course corrections (in the sense of adjusting actions or reprogramming results).

The results unit is a kind of situation room and planning unit of the Government, not only because it monitors, informs and (re)programs, but because, for these reasons, it coordinates and exercises crucial strategic control (in the sense that it should pay close attention to required course corrections rather than to the recording of deeds and facts, or the mere analysis of whether they converge or diverge from Government results).

The metaphor of situation room or war room makes it clear that the results unit is an essential deliberation instrument, a unit of action that issues corrective, punitive and compensatory decisions with short feedback cycles. It is not focused on collecting and processing information, but on qualifying judgment and shortening response time. The determinants of economic feasibility of a war room are the volume of information and the required response time. Nodal networks with huge amounts of information, but with enough time for thinking before making decisions, contrast with others, where the decision-making pace is very fast, but little information is required, or the information required has been previously processed. The combination of maximum volume/minimum time is what justifies the setting up of a situation or war room.

Thus, the results unit constitutes the nerves and the brain of the Government. Therefore, it must be endowed with clear centrality, and be very close to the chief executive. Chart 6 illustrates the position of the results unit, with the red arrows representing the main information flows.

**Chart 6. Positioning of Results Unit**



The results unit should design specific monitoring and evaluation schemes, although they should basically be grounded on vertical and horizontal agreements. Monitoring and evaluation arrangements should be based on different cycles and modalities, and may use the collegiate bodies for such purpose (internal or external evaluation committees). Integration between the results unit and social communication and internal and external control systems is also crucial for promoting transparency and accountability.

Finally, as a sphere for agreeing results, a core function of the results unit is to provide conditions for good contractual relations regarding the four basic elements of a contractual relationship: targets, means, control and incentives.

**Chief**

**Final Considerations**

**Executive**

In a broader sense, the matrix approach is based on a concept that combines elements of strategy (mobilizing targets, programmatic targets) and structure (units, resources, etc.) – that may, in principle, be applied both at the macro and multi-organizational level (within the general scope of supranational, national, local state governments, etc.) and intra-organizational level (internally in government organizations, private companies and community entities, as well as their units). The matrix approach is, in this sense, a governance instrument.

Governance is the key word for the matrix approach because, ultimately, the purpose is to increase capacities (mainly the State capacity<sup>iv</sup> to achieve development results), based on the ability of organizations to fulfill their mandate in an effective, efficient and sustainable way.

This approach has already been applied successfully to different spheres of the Brazilian government. At the federal level, the Ministry of Health has developed a results-oriented management model based on the matrix approach and balanced scorecard (BSC) methodologies (Temporão and Bassit, 2009). The implementation of this model involved a major process of organizational transformation that included: remodeling of the structure and processes, innovations in people and technology management and a cost optimization initiative. As a result of the work carried out, 70% of the actions envisaged in the strategic agenda of the MoH reached satisfactory performance in the first evaluation cycle undertaken.

At the state level, Minas Gerais (MG) developed the project 'Management Shock', which introduced a results-oriented management culture that was crucial to stabilize public accounts, increase investment capacity and significantly improve the quality of public services (Vilhena et al, 2006; Saraiva & Gomes, 2008). This initiative from Minas Gerais was later adopted by various other states and contributed to the dissemination of results-oriented management in the country.

At the municipal level, the City of Curitiba was the first to implement results-oriented management. In this case, all the 28 municipal agencies signed the Results Agreements (Giacomini, Marini and Alfonso, 2009). These 543 agreements contemplated targets, of which 446 (82%) have been met within the established timeframes, as measured in the evaluation of the city hall's results (Curitiba, 2009).

It is a clear bet on rationality, seeking to connect means to pre-established ends, in a clear demonstration of a “visible managerial hand” of government. This bet is the opposite of a surrendering view in which a “reduction” of agendas (around reductionist or unchallenging initiatives) would be a requirement of an increasingly complex and fragmentary “reality”, and constitutes a substantive claim that governments need greater and more concrete commitment towards results.

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### Notes

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<sup>i</sup> Among which the following should be noted: Balanced Scorecard (BSC) (Kaplan & Norton 2004) Bain & Company (Gottfredson & Schaubert, 2008); Performance Prism (focus on stakeholders) (Neely & Adams, 2002); Hoshin Kanri (focus on guidelines and causes) (Akao, 1991); Rummler & Brache (performance variables in objectives, project and management) (Rummler & Brache, 1995); Quantum (time, quality and cost measurements) (Hronec, 1993); Porter's Value Chain (Porter, 1985); Total Quality Management – TQM (Creech, 1995); PMBOK (project management body of knowledge and life cycle) (PMI, 2004); and Supply Chain Management, (Lambert & Knemeyer, 2005).

<sup>ii</sup> Concerning the issue of cross-cuttingness, the matrix approach allows more responsive treatment of cross-cutting issues, those permeating several organizational units, demanding relational treatment and a multi-dimensional poliedric view (Serra, 2004).

<sup>iii</sup> The idea of structural alignment or fitness, as well as of most contemporary approaches of organizational management and transformation is based on the contingency-based argument of structural co-variation. The notion of structural co-variation emphasizes the relationship between organizational structure and the dynamics of the environment external to the organization, based on variables such as technology, market and persons (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1965).

<sup>iv</sup> Two essential references to the concept of State capacities are Grindle, M. (1997), Lopes & Theison (2003) and Mizrahi (2004).