

Collaboration between Unions: What can the US Learn from New Zealand?

Mark Harcourt* and Helen Lam

Waikato University
mark@waikato.ac.nz

Athabasca University
helenl@athabascau.ca

Abstract

Exclusivity in union representation is a deeply-entrenched policy in North America, despite criticisms regarding its effectiveness and infringement of fundamental freedoms. Many unionists, academics, and law-makers fear that any movement towards multi-unionism would harm inter-union relationships and generate chaos, on the premise that unions would compete rather than collaborate, especially in organizing. This study explores whether such fears are well-founded by conducting interviews on inter-union collaboration with union executives in New Zealand, where unions have overlapping areas of representation coverage. Collaboration was found to be common, not only over bargaining and lobbying, but also in organizing.

Introduction

Exclusive representation is a key feature of the North American labor relations system. Exclusive representation refers to the policy of allowing only one union, the one with a majority of votes, the sole legal right to represent a given group of workers. From its inception, this sole-agent representation system was seen as essential to strengthening union voice and solidarity by curtailing inter-union competition and conflict, especially around organizing. In more recent years, the system has been criticized for precipitating the drastic decline in US private sector union density (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008; Troy, 2004), undemocratically denying representation rights and the freedom of association (and non-association) to workers, especially voting minorities (e.g., Adams, 2006; Godard, 2000; Harcourt and Lam, 2007; Summers, 1990), and increasing union “bureaucracy and complacency” (Delaney, 1998: 428). Nevertheless, the system survives, because of a deep-seated fear that abandoning exclusivity would shatter the foundation for good relations between unions. The assumption is that unions are unable to work together to sort out the “best” arrangements for membership coverage and bargaining. How valid is this assumption and how well-grounded is the fear of nonexclusive representation?

In this paper, our focus is on inter-union cooperation in a multi-union setting, where unions frequently represent the same groups of workers in the same workplaces. Since this is not available in North America, we conducted our empirical work in New Zealand, which adopted a voluntary, multiple union representation system with the enactment of the 1991 Employment Contracts Act. Data were obtained from semi-structured interviews with key union leaders. Our questions were derived from a review of the literature and our general understanding of the industrial relations context in New Zealand.

Conceptual Framework for Inter-union Cooperation

There are a number of reasons why unions may want to cooperate with each other. For instance, there may be gains for the overall labor movement, the unions involved, as well as for the membership. In this section, we examine the different areas of collaboration, including collaboration over bargaining, organizing, policy issues, and others.

Collaboration over Bargaining

Sharing the same workplace can induce unions to collaborate as a strategy to counter the employer's power and improve the union's bargaining leverage. Indeed, 29% of responding worker representatives in the 1980 UK Workplace Industrial Relations Survey considered joint bargaining an effective means of avoiding the problems of 'divide and rule' by the employer (Machin, Stewart, and Van Reenen, 1993: 282). Akkerman (1979: 450) notes that "[w]hen interests converge and overlap in membership is absent or only moderate, unions may see opportunities to join forces" such as through joint bargaining, and coordination in strikes. Martins (2005: 371), using a model of union coalition, concludes that when there are only two unions representing the same worker group, cooperation between them resembles a monopoly situation and that "collusion is always superior to competition" from the union perspective. More specifically, Horn and Wolinsky (1988) demonstrate that groups of workers can raise wages by bargaining together, if the groups are labor substitutes, and by bargaining separately, if they are labor complements. So, there are certainly circumstances in which inter-union cooperation is beneficial to workers.

Union cooperation over bargaining can take many forms from tacit coordination (such as harmonizing bargaining agendas, sharing information, joint planning and mutual consultation, respect for each other's picket lines, as well as tangible and intangible support to striking members of other unions) to formal coalition in bargaining with the same demands, joint negotiation process, and common settlement (Hildebrand, 1968). Moreover, joint union negotiation is nothing new, dating at least as far back as the 1880s in the construction industry and 1902 in the railroads (Hildebrand, 1968:524). Cohen (1976: 83) identified at least seven major factors that have stimulated the growth of joint or coordinated bargaining. They are the expansion of corporations (and the corresponding increase in employer power), centralization of labor policies in multi-plant companies, union weakness due to fragmentation, growth in the complexity of labor relations issues, standardization of organization or industry-wide terms of employment, inability of individual unions to push for changes independently, and the need to design a bargaining structure that maximizes union bargaining power.

Collaboration over Organizing

Unionists and industrial relations scholars have been concerned about the drastically declining union density rate across much of the developed nations, but especially in the US, which has seen private sector union density drop from a peak of 35.7% in 1953 to a moribund 7.5% in 2007 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2008; Troy 2004). This has prompted many calls for union revival, with a heavy emphasis on organizing. Schenk (2004: 182-183) argues that it is not enough to simply re-direct resources into organizing. Unions need to begin "to work cooperatively on organizing efforts", ranging from "tacit agreements among several unions on sectoral/workplace targets" to "major joint organizing drives; and establishing organizing institutes to bring union organizers together for common training and sharing experiences on organizing successes and failures". Similarly, Dobson (1997) suggests that unions coordinate member recruitment either by jointly campaigning for members across an industry or by

separately campaigning but on the understanding that potential recruits are referred to other unions if there is a better occupational match.

Where there is overlapping membership coverage, unions are normally expected to be fighting rather than cooperating. Why? It is commonly assumed that each union wants as large a slice of the membership pie as possible, and so competing for members is inevitable. Any thought that they might collaborate in organizing is therefore dismissed immediately. However, this premise has not been systematically tested and remains questionable for a number of reasons. First, inter-union competition for members is ordinarily kept in check by union federation codes of conduct, which require adherence to ‘no poaching’ or ‘no raiding’ rules as a condition of membership. Such ‘no raiding’ pacts require unions to forego a degree of self-interest for the sake of harmonious co-existence. Second, unions may avoid organizing members whose occupation or industry are a poor fit with the existing membership base and the union’s strategic plans for achieving or maintaining influence over employers. Third, unions are likely to avoid costly conflicts over members, because they sap resources and deter non-union workers from joining any union. If conflict is not so dominant, is there room for unions to cooperate, as Schenk (2004) and Dobson (1997) have proposed, even if they have overlapping coverage of worker groups? This is certainly an issue worth exploring.

Collaboration over Policy Issues

Union cooperation is also evident in political lobbying activities, when unions share a common social vision (Greer, 2006). According to Hurd and Pinnock (2004: 211), “[i]deologically, all unions are tied together by the objective of securing workers’ fight in our society”. Inter-union collaboration increases the strength of the labor movement, and a stronger labor movement, in turn, helps in influencing “public policy and budgetary decisions at all levels of government”. In particular, at times when government enacts legislation perceived as thwarting union representation or rolling back worker gains, it is important for unions to engage in joint lobbying, petitioning, and protesting to make a more powerful stand and attract more public support.

Joint union actions on policy issues are often facilitated and supported by union federations and councils. These organizations can provide affiliates with the leadership resources, and support needed to advocate public policy changes for the good of the working class and union solidarity. They offer opportunities for affiliates to meet, interact, and collaborate through, for example, the running of workshops, seminars, and conferences. They can also set up specific task forces to work on problem areas, such as health and safety, of common interest to several unions and their members.

Methods

Sample

Our sample includes 14 of New Zealand’s 172 registered unions¹. The size of these unions varied from just below 1,000 to 56,000, which is considered relatively large given that the majority of New Zealand’s unions were formed after the passage of the 2000 Employment Relations Act and have fewer than 1,000 members (Barry, 2004). Together, these 14 unions represented about 246,800 members (as at August, 2008 when the data were collected), or roughly 65% of the 382,000 union member population in New Zealand (Feinberg-Deniali and Lafferty, 2008:33).

¹ Figure from the Registrar of Unions, Department of Labour, February, 2008

The union sample was selected on the basis of a few key criteria. First, we selected the bigger and more well-established unions, as their insights and experiences would likely be more representative of the New Zealand labor movement. Therefore, we included in our sample the largest four unions: the PSA (civil service), NZEI (primary school teachers), EPMU (manufacturing and other sectors), and NZNO (nurses). Second, for a similar reason, we need the unions to represent a broad range of industries, including, for example, public administration (PSA), health care (NZNO), manufacturing (EPMU), and financial services (FINSEC). Third, logistically, the union headquarters had to be easily accessible in downtown Wellington, New Zealand's capital city, so that the interviews could be conducted efficiently in terms of both time and cost.

Data Collection

We interviewed the senior executives of the unions, usually the general secretary or someone in a comparable position. Semi-structured interviews lasting about one hour each were conducted at the unions' headquarters. Semi-structured interviews allowed us the flexibility to direct attention to relevant areas and ask follow-up questions as new information came to light. The recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim for detailed analysis, which was done separately by the two co-authors in order to ensure independence and greater objectivity. Main themes were identified, coding was done accordingly, and key responses were summarized and compared across unions. An iterative process was adopted in the data analysis whereby the themes, coding categories, and key findings went through cycles of discussion and refinement.

Results

There is a lot of collaboration between and among New Zealand unions. The lion's share of it involves potential rivals in the same sector; close relationships are almost exclusively with those who share the same problems and opportunities. Unions in unrelated sectors are generally 'off the radar' completely. Furthermore, the unions you help, and are closest to, are often the unions you have the biggest arguments and fights with, much as in a family situation. Collaboration and conflict are not mutually exclusive; they are part and parcel of the same normal relationships. For instance, two unions in the sample squabble over some bargaining and policy issues, and yet routinely join forces in presenting a united front to employers or the government. In several respects, the same situation applies to two other pairs of unions in other sectors.

Most collaboration relates to bargaining, though some unions cooperate over a wide range of issues. Why do they collaborate? Four interviewees stated that they collaborate mainly to establish a stronger and more credible voice in either bargaining or lobbying. In other words, when unions speak as one, they are more likely to be believed. When unions act in unison, they can exert more pressure to get what they want. In the same vein, two other interviewees argued that bargaining together enabled unions to achieve higher wages and better conditions through the latent threat of concerted industrial action. One interviewee indicated that "(t)he settlements we have (had) in the last two to three years, when the cooperation has grown, are a good percentage point on average higher (than settlements) in the previous years."

Two interviewees also pointed out that bargaining together was fairer, because it meant the same outcomes for the same types of workers or better outcomes for unskilled workers. One interviewee made several remarks about this, of which the following was typical: "And so *unskilled workers* have to strike just to be able to get a decent tea break, and when you bring all of those unions together under an agreement that says there are certain

principles, then the gains for *unskilled workers* can be much greater.” The other interviewee said “... I think that was the other unions benefiting from *our union*, actually. Yeah! And certainly the *less skilled staff* benefited from this situation affecting *more skilled staff*. And you know the insistence by the unions that new money had to be given to *less skilled staff* as well, even if it was a lesser proportion.” In a related point, interviewees claimed that coordinated or joint bargaining was particularly advantageous, and hence appealing, to weaker unions.

Four interviewees felt that collaboration was essential to membership recruitment, given the scale economies of organizing and the negative effects of unions competing for members on workers’ willingness to join any union. One interviewee had this to say: “My observation and experience always is, particularly when non-members see at least two unions squabbling with each other, they just turn off. I’ve had that feedback, not just from non-members, but members as well.” Another interviewee made a similar comment: “... (o)ur union’s view is that active contestability essentially only leads to de-unionization, and, as a result of that, we have a pretty clear policy that we will not actively contest other unions.”

Collaboration over bargaining

All 14 unions admitted to some form of cooperation over collective bargaining with at least one other union. The degree of collaboration varies considerably. At one extreme, unions only share bargaining information and there is no joint coordination; bargaining occurs independently and at different times. For instance, five unions share a lot of bargaining-related information with their rivals. The following remark was typical: “... we let them know when our bargaining is happening and what sort of money we’re getting.” One of these five unions even allows its much smaller rival to observe the actual negotiations. Why share information? Most unions shared information as a courtesy, a goodwill gesture of potential benefit to the recipient union. However, one union stated that information sharing was a first step towards closer coordination in bargaining. Another union suggested that information sharing, especially about positive outcomes achieved through bargaining, enabled it to covertly market its services to other unions’ members. At the time of data collection, a large union had just received an interesting request from a couple of smaller unions to provide them with training and advocacy in bargaining. Thinking that “the more allies you have got, the better”, the union was actively considering the request and seemingly favorably disposed to it.

A higher level of bargaining collaboration involves coordination of bargaining claims/ demands and strategies/ tactics. Eight of the 14 unions indicated that they engaged in some form of joint coordination. Most commonly, they tried to negotiate at roughly the same time and/ or with the same kinds of bargaining demands. For instance, one official admitted that “... we always sit down and have pre-bargaining sessions ... Each union brings their own log of claims, and (we) sit down and identify what each union must have and what we might support and what we might not necessarily ... support.” However, coordinated strike action was much less common. Only two of the unions admitted to ever having jointly decided to strike against the same employer at the same time. A third union had offered support to a striking union by not crossing its picket lines. A fourth union indicated that its members had provided a striking union with moral support, mostly through letters and emails.

The highest level of collaboration entails joint bargaining for a multi-union collective agreement or MUCA. Thirteen of the 14 unions indicated that they had negotiated MUCAs with one or more other unions. For some, MUCAs represent a high proportion of all collective agreements. In one case, MUCAs were 85% of all collective agreement, and in two others, approximately 40%. For others, MUCAs play a less important role. Three

unions used MUCAs for about 20% of their agreements, and four used them for about 10%. Three unions used them less than five percent of the time. As a general rule, MUCAs were employed if unions had overlapping membership coverage and so shared representation. As an example, one union reported having overlapping coverage, or nonexclusive representation, for 25% of its collective agreements. MUCAs were used in 80% of these overlapping coverage situations, or roughly 20% of all collective agreements. In contrast, unions which had few MUCAs normally had sole bargaining representation for 80% or more of their collective agreements. In one typical case, one large union bargained alone for the 80% of agreements where it had no overlapping bargaining coverage with other unions. Where coverage overlapped, the union coordinated bargaining with other unions for about 10% of agreements, and jointly negotiated a MUCA for the other 10% of agreements. However, there are exceptions. One of the large unions seldom engages with other unions in any form of coordination. Why? Basically, it is the dominant union in almost all workplaces. As a result, getting together with anyone else offers little prospect of increasing strike power, resources, or expertise. On the downside, bargaining coalitions mean higher transaction costs, longer delays, sharing control over bargaining, and more opportunities for a rival to take unwarranted credit for good settlement outcomes. Another union, the only one not to have negotiated any MUCAs, gave similar reasons for not coordinating or jointly negotiating with its puny rival.

Collaboration over organizing

Nine of the 14 unions had helped their rivals with recruitment. All nine had referred prospective members to other unions in a better position to service particular types of members, because of bargaining coverage, bargaining unit size, and/ or industrial/ occupational fit. The following was a typical comment about this practice: "... it just didn't feel ethically right to take the membership of ... *another occupation* and not offer them the full advantages of being in *our union*. So, we made a very explicit decision to.... say you have to go ... and to support them moving out to *a different union*." One union helped fund a weaker union's organizing campaigns. Several unions had each campaigned to recruit members for all unions in the sector. Other unions had divvied up the recruitment task, so that one union had recruited for two unions, itself and a potential rival, in one workplace, and, as a quid pro quo, the other union had done the same in an alternative workplace.

Collaboration over policy

Ten interviewees indicated that they had cooperated in some way with other unions to change government policy. In general, policy-oriented unions had more than one way of trying to influence government jointly with other unions. Most of this inter-union cooperation was limited to just three sectors, with the government acting as employer in two of these. All three sectors are heavily unionized.

Six interviewees indicated that they worked through the NZCTU to lobby government. All had participated in NZCTU-organized workshops, councils, committees, and/ or forums. Many of these concentrate exclusively on the problems of particular industries.

Seven interviewees indicated that their union had worked closely with employers and the government in tripartite structures to develop and/ or implement policies for their industry. In one case, the employers, unions, and relevant ministry discussed the "(f)uture needs of the industry and, in particular, the amount of labour requirements and capacity," especially training capacity. Another tripartite group focused on the registration and discipline of professionals in the industry. Yet another discussed "... a whole range of issues: staffing, funding, resourcing" With one union, the focus was more operational, with the

parties agreeing on how they were going to interact with each other and make decisions. Finally, joint action in one industry had been precipitated by a ministerial inquiry into health and safety.

Seven interviewees said that their union had joined forces with at least one other union to lobby government directly for policy change. For instance, one union had coalesced with another to petition parliament. In a different situation, two unions had successfully lobbied parliament to have a proposed funding structure revoked. Two other unions had made joint select committee submissions, opposing or supporting various bills before Parliament. Finally, as Labour Party affiliates, several unions had used party channels to speak more directly and less publicly to senior ministers about their policy concerns.

Inhibiting factors

The interviewees identified several factors which had prevented them from collaborating more often and on a greater scale with other unions. Five interviewees blamed personality conflicts, usually between union leaders, for creating barriers to cooperation. Many of these personality conflicts were historical, reflecting clashes over events that had in some cases occurred decades earlier. In some cases, these fights had been generated by so-called turf protection, with union leaders anxious to preserve their own high-ranking jobs.

Three interviewees talked of snobbery and elitism, often associated with pay differentials between the members of one union and another, as an impediment to working together. Another interviewee felt that the many, small, company unions in his industry simply didn't have the expertise to meaningfully collaborate, especially with respect to lobbying over policy issues. Five interviewees cited differences in union culture, reflected in member attitudes and values, as a major hurdle to developing positive relationships with rival unions. As one union official put it, "(t)here is, rightly or wrongly, ... a perception of a difference of culture between the two unions. ... (Our union) has been regarded as more militant." Three interviewees argued that weak unions were often reluctant to work with stronger counterparts, for fear of losing members to these rivals. One interviewee further commented that small unions might see collaboration in a situation of unbalanced power as more like a takeover. Two unions in the same sector both blamed sensational media reporting for generating occasional frictions between them.

Enabling factors

The union officials identified a number of factors which had facilitated cooperation between and among the unions. Some of these involved law changes, brought about by the 2000 Employment Relations Act. For example, two officials thought that the special legal provisions for multi-union collective agreements (MUCAs) in the Act had made joint collective bargaining easier. Similarly, five interviewees felt that the good faith provisions in the 2000 Employment Relations Act had induced unions to act more openly and honestly with each other. One official explained it this way: "So it has made a difference ... knowing that good faith applies between unions as well. We often trot that out ourselves to unions that are difficult. (We say) 'listen, we are bound by this'." Three officials spoke more generally, arguing that the more supportive environment for collective bargaining, ushered in by the 2000 Employment Relations Act, had encouraged unions to collaborate rather than compete.

Five officials acknowledged the key role employers can play in getting the unions together. Four claimed that, with the Labour Government in power, public sector employers were far more committed to working cooperatively with all stakeholder groups, including unions. One official put it this way: if there had been "...no chance of a

(government-sponsored) tripartite forum, for example, we (would) not even meet with the *other union*.” Two union leaders also suggested that some employers, keen to reduce the transaction costs of contracting and stop the leap-frogging of settlements, had pushed unions into coordinated and/ or joint bargaining. For example, one official noted that “... if it is two unions, they just want to have one bargaining round, one collective agreement; make it simple ...” However, three officials commented that, in their experience, employers often prefer to deal with unions separately. Sometimes, this is part of a ‘divide and rule’ strategy to weaken unions. Sometimes, this reflects a desire to avoid being accused of bad faith or of having violated workers’ freedom of association.

Other officials attributed collaboration to factors associated with the labor movement itself. Four ascribed a key role to the NZCTU in bringing about inter-union dialogue. The NZCTU policy groups were seen as critical to inducing unions in the same industry to meet, discuss, and formulate concrete policy proposals for government. In addition, the NZCTU’s protocols were lauded for preventing and resolving petty disputes over organizing members, and encouraging unions to re-focus on ‘bigger picture’ issues. Former NZCTU boss, Ross Wilson, was heavily praised for fostering inter-union cooperation. On a smaller scale, other union bosses were also praised for their team-building personalities.

Recommendations for more collaboration

The interviewees had some suggestions for increasing inter-union collaboration. Three officials felt that the NZCTU should play a stronger role in developing and implementing coordinated bargaining and organizing strategies for different sectors of the economy. The general belief was that the NZCTU should be better resourced to carry out such roles, though no one was clear on how this might be done. No direct government policy change was envisioned in achieving this goal. As one union official said, “(t)here are a lot of things that could happen to promote collaboration. The bigger question is could you actually regulate or policy-prescribe those things and I am not sure that you could.” Another echoed a similar view: “I think we have to do it (facilitating greater collaboration) ourselves. I don’t think you can legislate for it completely. It’s a battle that has got to go on inside the (labor) movement.”

Some suggestions focused on enhancing the power/ effectiveness of joint action in order to make it more meaningful and potentially attractive. For, instance, two officials favoured legalizing secondary picketing; another supported legalizing secondary strikes. Likewise, two officials felt that more unions would collaborate in bargaining, if it were easier to opt for a multi-employer collective agreement or MECA. Specifically, they favored leaving this decision to union executives rather than having it decided through a membership ballot.

Other officials felt that collaboration would be easier, if there were fewer potential rivals and these rivals were larger, stronger, better resourced, and clearly not aligned with management. Five officials recommended that, as a condition of registration, every union should have to satisfy a minimum size requirement, possibly of as few as 100 members. One official provided the following justification for this stance: “(a) lot of people have said maybe greater membership, minimum membership. The reason they are saying that is because they think some of the defensive posturing by some of the unions is related to their small size... power. They are too weak, and they see cooperation as a takeover.” Three union bosses also argued that the Department of Labour should periodically audit unions to ensure that they are democratically controlled and financially self-sufficient, and not therefore dependent upon management.

Discussion and Implications

What can the US learn from New Zealand's experiment with nonexclusive bargaining, which began with the enactment of the 1991 Employment Contracts Act? Several major findings emerge from this study. Perhaps the most important is that inter-union collaboration is pervasive in the multi-union setting of New Zealand. Moreover, collaboration extends across bargaining, organizing, and policy-related activities like lobbying. Almost all of it occurs within sectors, inasmuch as unions are united by common industry-related concerns. There is conflict as well, to be sure, but this is occasional and mostly subdued.

The New Zealand unions interviewed, much like many of their British counterparts (Machin, Stewart, and Van Reenen, 1993), generally believe that they can get more of what they want by speaking with one voice and by making the same or similar demands simultaneously. It makes more sense to work together to increase the size of the proverbial pie, far less to squabble about respective shares. As Martins (2005: 371) says, "collusion is always superior to competition" from a union viewpoint. Interestingly, this logic applies just as much to organizing as bargaining, contrary to the common American belief that overlapping coverage would only lead to inter-union fighting over members. The unions in this study often help each other with recruitment, and usually sufficiently respect another union's established presence in a given workplace not to poach its members. It is usually more cost-effective for a union to specialize in representing large numbers of workers in particular workplaces than to divert its efforts and resources into poaching small numbers of members from rival unions, especially if there's no obvious benefit to the labor movement, overall. Furthermore, it is a commonly held belief that fighting over members only leads to de-unionization, and so is in no union's interest.

If anything, nonexclusive representation, or overlapping coverage as it is called in New Zealand, drives unions to cooperate even more closely, especially in bargaining. Specifically, when two or more unions represent the same group of workers, they are likely to bargain together for a multi-union collective agreement. At the very least, some form of joint coordination or information sharing can usually be expected. The exception is the generally large union which represents a high proportion of a given group of workers compared to its much smaller rival or rivals. In this situation, the dominant union typically feels that the perceived benefits of joint action, in terms of increased bargaining power, are outweighed by the costs, in terms of delays, decision-making difficulties, and the loss of kudos to the other union(s) for having bargained a good settlement.

Certain institutions have helped facilitate collaboration. Perhaps chief among these is the multi-union collective agreement or MUCA. The procedures in the 2000 Employment Relations Act have made it easy for union executives to opt for a MUCA; very crucially, employers cannot stop them from doing so. The law also requires unions to treat each other in good faith, and, in particular, not to deliberately mislead or deceive each other. Likewise, the NZCTU provides various councils, forums, workshops, and working groups to facilitate dialogue between unions, especially when they occupy the same sector. It has also developed highly effective protocols for resolving disputes between affiliates, especially over the organizing of each other's members. These protocols provide a procedure for repatriating recently arrived members defecting from a rival union, which requires both unions to mutually address the issues that prompted the members to leave.

References

- Adams, R. J. (2006). *Labour left out: Canada's failure to protect and promote collective bargaining as a human right*. Ottawa, ON: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.
- Akkerman, A. (2008). Union competition and strikes: The need for analysis at the sectoral level. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 61(4), 445-459.
- Barry, M. (2004). New employee representation: Legal developments and New Zealand unions. *Employee Relations*, 26(1/2), 203-223.
- Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2008). Union Members in 2007. U.S. Department of Labor. <http://www.bls.gov/news.release.union2.nr0.htm> (accessed November 19, 2008).
- Cohen, A. (1976). Union rationale and objectives of coordinated bargaining. *Labor Law Journal*, 27(2), 75-83.
- Delaney, J.T. (1998). Redefining the Right-to-Work Debate: Unions and the Dilemma of Free Choice. *Journal of Labor Research* 14(3), 425-442.
- Dobson, J.R. 1997. The effects of multi-unionism: a survey of large manufacturing establishments. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 35(4), 547-566.
- Feinberg-Danieli, G., and Lafferty, G. (2008). Unions and Union Membership in New Zealand: Annual Review for 2006. *New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations*, 32 (3), 31-39.
- Freeman, J., and Brittain, J. (1977). Union merger process and industrial environment. *Industrial Relations*, 16(2), 173-185.
- Godard, J. (2000). *Industrial relations, the economy, and society* (2nd edition). North York, Ontario: Captus Press.
- Greer, I. (2006). Business union vs. Business union? Understanding the split in the US labour movement. *Capital & Class*, 90. Retrieved January 3, 2009 at <http://www.cseweb.org.uk/pdfs/CC90/1.Greer.pdf>.
- Harcourt, M., and Lam, H. (2007). Union certification: A critical analysis and proposed alternative. *WorkingUSA: The Journal of Labor and Society*, 11, 327-345.
- Hildebrand, George H. 1968. Coordinated bargaining: An economist's point of view. *Industrial Relations Research Association Proceedings of the 1968 Annual Spring Meeting*, IRRA, Madison, Wisconsin.
- Horn, H., and Wolinsky, A. (1988). Worker substitutability and patterns of unionisation. *Economic Journal*, 98, 484-497.
- Hurd, R.W., and Pinnock, S. (2004). Public sector unions: Will they thrive or struggle to survive? *Journal of Labor Research*, 25(2), 211-221.
- Machin, S., Stewart, M. and Van Reenan, J. (1993). The economic effects of multiple unionism: Evidence from the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 95, 279-296.
- Martins, A.P. (2005). Union duopoly with heterogeneous labour. *International Journal of Social Economics*, 32(4), 339-382.
- Schenk, C. (2004). Forum: Reorganizing Unions – Union organizing: An Ontario Labour Perspective. *Studies in Political Economy*, 74, 181-190.
- Summers, C. (1990). Unions without majority -- a black hole? *Chicago Kent Law Review* 66, 531-48.
- Troy, L. 2004. *Twilight of the old unionism*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.